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Abstract 
This paper asks whether political competition has played a role in moderating the governance issues 
that arise in relation to Canada’s fiscal structure. By fiscal structure we mean three distinct but 
interrelated fiscal dimensions of the state: financial stability, long run size and short run interventions 
into the private economy, particularly with respect to the business cycle. The distinctiveness of this 
paper is that it focuses on four different measures of the degree of political competition: the size of 
the seat majority of the governing party in the House; the distribution of the volatility adjusted 
winning margins of the governing party; the proportion of electorally marginal constituencies 
adjusted for asymmetry; and the Przeworski-Sprague measure of electoral competitiveness at the 
constituency level. The analysis accounts for the differing time series properties of the political and 
economic variables and the comingling of long and short term fiscal policies in the time series data 
while finding support for the hypotheses that greater political competition will enhance fiscal stability 
(maintain a non-accelerating debt to GDP ratio), that government size will converge from above on 
economic and structural fundamentals and that period deficits/surpluses will align better with the 
business cycle. The potential impact of greater political competition is analyzed by applying the deficit 
model to the period of fiscal instability that arose in the 1980’s.  
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1. Introduction 
This paper is concerned with the role played by political competition in moderating the principal-
agent problems that arise in relation to a country’s fiscal structure. By fiscal structure we mean 
three distinct but interrelated fiscal dimensions of the state: its financial stability, its long run size 
and its short run interaction with the private economy in response to the business cycle. To model 
any or all of these elements in terms of the underlying preferences of voters in a democracy (given 
technology, endowments and the shocks that hit the economy) there must exist some significant 
degree of political competition, otherwise the governing party would simply pursue its own special 
interest at the expense of general welfare (Downs, 1957; Wittman, 1989; Coughlin, 1994; Chen, 
2000).  For this reason we look at political competition as the key ingredient that ties the output of 
the state to the wishes of the community.  It does so by generating the appropriate incentives for 
politicians and governments when designing and implementing economic policy (Winer and Ferris, 
2008). The analysis is then applied to Canada.  
From an overall perspective, the long run survival of Canada’s parliamentary system and the 
continued advancement of economic welfare in Canada suggest that the degree of political 
competition has been both substantial and beneficial. However, the view that political competition 
does in political markets the same thing that economic competition does in private markets - that 
is, drive tax-prices down to marginal cost while insuring the level of services demanded by voters - 
is not the only possibility.2 In the same way that the absence of property rights in economic markets 
leads market competition among rivals to overproduce and so dissipate economic rents, political 
competition is sometimes argued to have become excessive, leading to excessive size and the 
corruption of public policy (in a welfare sense).3 Hence to assess whether political competition in 
Canada has operated to enhance efficiency, we must find ways of measuring changes in its intensity 
and relate those changes to a set of predicted outcomes.4 In this paper we do so by considering 
political competition to have a number of different measurable dimensions: the degree of electoral 
completion among the political parties within its constituencies, the ex ante degree of asymmetry in 
the distribution of safe/marginal seats among the major contending national parties, the ex post 
                                                          
2 We are aware of the difficulties in drawing exact parallels between competition in private and public sectors, 
particularly because the existence of the collective choice process makes the meaning of what is ' demanded by 
voters' a complex issue once one departs from the simple median voter situation. This paper is consistent with the 
view that competition drives policy to cater to a weighted average of voter preferences, with weights determined 
by the inequalities of political influence. See Coughlin (1994) and Hinich and Munger (1994).  We do not explore 
empirically the implications of shifts in the distribution of these weights over time.       
3 See, for example, Sato (2003), Cai and Treisman (2004), and Lizzeri and Persico (2005). 
4 This paper represents an extensive rewriting of an earlier unpublished paper “Political Competition and the 
extension of the franchise: Political influences on Canadian Fiscal Choices, 1870 – 2000”.   Recent papers that 
relate political competition to economic performance (rather than fiscal structure) include Besley, Persson and 
Sturm (2010),  Padovano and Ricciuti (2009), and Sorenson (2014). 
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intensity of competition among the parties in the legislature between elections and the distribution 
of volatility adjusted winning margins across the constituencies won by the governing party.  We 
consider the implication of changes in these dimensions for the evolution of the fiscal structure of 
the Government of Canada.  
Because many of the structural elements to be discussed in this paper are implicitly long run 
equilibrium relationships, the ability to test these hypotheses requires both a long time series of 
data and the use of appropriate time series techniques. With a considerable amount of reliable long 
run data generated within a stable political environment, Canada--from its emergence as a modern 
state at Confederation (1867) to the present—more than satisfies this necessary condition.5 The 
Canadian data used in this paper are annual and run for one hundred and forty five years from 1870 
through 2015.  
One noteworthy feature of fiscal data is that the observable outcomes of the different policies that 
comprise a country’s fiscal structure are all embodied in the same time series. That is the long run 
empirical relationships that describe both Canada’s history of financial stability and government size 
are part of the same data series that incorporate Canada’s history of countercyclical fiscal response. 
This means that the long and short run hypotheses that explain fiscal policy choices need to be 
modeled and tested together and this aspect of the data motivates our use of cointegration and 
error correction analysis.  
A final feature of the data that complicates our analysis is that a number of the metrics used have 
different time series characteristics. For example, some of our measures of political competition are 
stationary across time while others and most economic data are not.  Hence special care must be 
taken with how the differing time series dimensions of the economic and political variables are 
combined. Here we use the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) procedure developed by Pesaran, 
Shin and Smith (2001) to combine variables with different degrees of integration and thus allow for 
the capturing of separate effects on the long and short run.  A complete list of variables used, their 
descriptive statistics and time series properties is included in the Data Appendix of this paper.  Time 
series of each measure can be found on the accompanying web site.  
The paper continues in Section 2 by describing in detail how political competition is viewed as 
affecting fiscal stability and government size. There we describe the set of measures used to proxy 
the different elements of political competition and explain how changes in these metrics are 
expected to change fiscal structure. Section 3 begins the testing of these hypotheses by first 
examining the stability of Canada’s fiscal structure under the assumption of a sufficient but 
invariant degree of political competition. Here stability implies that government spending and taxes 
                                                          
5 Even so, availability remains an issue. Unemployment figures, for example, are available in Canada only from 
1919 onwards so that for the long run, business cycles are measured in terms of variations in output growth rates. 
Similarly the ability to analyze the composition of government expenditures in detail is possible only from 1921 
onwards. 
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converge over time so that accumulated deficits or government debt as a fraction of GDP does not 
accelerate. We then examine the extent to which fiscal stability has been influenced by changes in 
our measures of political competition.  Using the finding of financial stability from Section 3 and its 
implication that the expenditure and revenue sizes of government cannot be independent over the 
long run, Section 4 uses a set of economic and demographic fundamentals to explain the long run 
expenditure and tax sizes of government before adding the measures of political competition. The 
greater flexibility of ARDL modeling then allows the separation of the long run equilibrium time 
path of government size from the short run (stationary) manifestation of countercyclical fiscal 
policy and the process of convergence back to the long run equilibrium path.  In this way we can 
examine how the different dimensions of political competition affect long run size, convergence to 
the long run and counter-cyclical intervention. Section 5 focuses explicitly on how the political 
competition variables relate to the deficit and the business cycle while Section 6 applies the model 
to the period of rapid federal debt accumulation between the mid-1970 and early 1990s by 
considering the performance of political competition throughout the period and illustrating how 
even minor changes in level of political competition could have changed the overall outcome.  
Section 7 concludes the paper by summarizing the economic and policy significance of our results.  
2. A principal-agent approach to fiscal structure 
This analysis extends the micro-political foundation of political regimes (see Persson et al 2000, 
Besley et al 2010, and Winer et al 2013) by viewing political competition as a multidimensional 
constraint on the behaviour of government in a principal-agent model of a country’s fiscal structure. 
The analysis is directed at single member, first-past-the-post Westminster style parliamentary 
democracy and tested against Canada.6 In such an approach the governing party is viewed as the 
agent representing the public as its principal, much as the board of directors serves as the agent for 
a firm’s shareholders. In the public choice literature, the agency problem is often posed as whether 
or not the individual members of the Congress vote differently from the wishes of their electorate 
(Higgs, 1989; Bender, 1994; Jung, Kenny and Lott; 1994).  In parliamentary systems, however, the 
political party is the key actor. The party winning the election is the agent that monitors and 
enforces the behaviour of its representatives while setting the overall policy agenda for government 
and the long life of the governing political parties in Canada serves as the commitment mechanism 
furthers the internalization of intertemporal externalities.  In parliamentary democracies, then, 
parties compete to win the right to govern by promising and delivering programs that better reflect 
the wishes of voters, much as Demsetz’s potential managers compete for the right to become the 
sole operator of a natural monopoly (Demsetz, 1968; Palmer, 1995).7  In the absence of information 
                                                          
6  Using a country like Canada allows us to avoid the complications associated with political systems that embody 
checks and balances and so diffuse responsibility for policy action. In a Westminster parliamentary system the 
governing party determines policy subject to its ability to maintain the confidence of the house. 
7 Note that Demsetz gets efficiency by expanding the margins along which performance can be specified.  In the 
political context, meaningful forcing contracts must permit effective enforcement of multi-dimensional campaign 
promises.  See the more extended discussion in Ferris, Winer and Grofman (2016). 
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and other coordination costs, and with open entry into the political arena, competition among 
political parties would result in the government providing the low cost program mix that best 
reflects the wishes of its constituents.  
 
In real world situations, however, coordination costs are never zero.8 The ability to organize a viable 
political party requires the political party to win and maintain the loyalty of members who typically 
join a party for reasons that are not coincident with the program wishes of the public. The party 
must then provide partisans with special benefits, perhaps in the form of positions in the new 
government and/or programs that cater to their special interests.  It follows that the incumbent 
governing party will normally provide a mixture of government services directed at the preferences 
of both the electorate and their own partisan members.  This is described in the political science 
literature as governments having to provide a mixture of “public” goods and “private” benefits 
(Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson and Morrow, 2003).  But while all political parties must 
provide for its members in one form or another, the ability of the party to cater to the special 
interests of its members at the expense of, or in addition to, the more general interests of the 
public will depend on how effective is the competition provided by opposition political parties.  
Here we focus on four particular types of political competition.  
First, the ability of a political party once elected to cater to its own partisan interests will depend in 
part on how effective is the competition provided by other political parties in the House of 
Commons.9 This will depend to an important degree on the proportion of the seats controlled by 
the winning party. The smaller is the opposition in the House, the less effective can competing 
parties be in monitoring the behavior of the party in power and hence the less costly it will be (in 
terms of losing political support) for the party in power to provide its members with specialized 
‘private’ benefits. The prediction is then that a larger realized majority in the House (LNSEATS) will 
signal less intense political competition and thus provide less of an incentive to maintain fiscal 
discipline to restrain larger than normal levels of government expenditure. To the extent that 
payment for expenditures can be transferred through time to a succeeding government, it also 
implies a larger sized deficit. 
While the size of the majority available to the governing party matters, the distribution of winning 
margins across the constituencies won by the governing party will be a measure of the party’s 
ability to form a coherent national policy strategy.  That is, the wider is the distribution of winning 
margins, given the size of the governing majority, the larger will be the proportion of constituency 
representatives who are subject to potential electoral loss and hence the larger the proportion who 
                                                          
8 Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2000) see the principal-agent problem of governance as arising out of three 
fundamental characteristics of political regimes: no direct democracy, no benevolent actors, and no outside 
enforcement.  Our analysis focuses on ways by which commitment can be more effectively policed by competition 
among political parties in Westminster parliamentary democracies. 
9 Question period and the presence of a free and effective press are two important ways by which insider 
information is transmitted to voters allowing political competition to constrain parliamentary governments.   
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will rely on the assistance of a cohesive national party.  In such cases the party will find it easier to 
design an overall direction for policy.  Our measure of this dimension of party unity is the coefficient 
of variation of the volatility adjusted winning vote margins of the governing party, CV_winning 
margin.  Higher values imply lower costs of achieving common agreement and in turn imply faster 
adjustment to the spending and taxation levels that are desired by the community and more of a 
concern with fiscal stability.  The coefficient of variation is then interacted with LNSEATS, 
INTER_LNSEATS, to provide a counter-measure to the size of the governing party’s majority. 
In addition to the size and cohesiveness of the governing majority, the ability of the party to realize 
specialized benefits for its partisans will depend upon how close or contestable the election is 
expected to be.  Here we define the degree of contestability as the proportion of constituencies that 
are not safe, where safe constituencies are ones that lie consistently in the upper tail of the 
distribution of winning vote margins.  More formally, for each election at time t we first construct a 
volatility adjusted, winning vote margin for each candidate of incumbent party p (which won in 
constituency j at time t-1).10 If this margin was more than one standard distribution above the mean 
of all such adjusted winning margins across all parties for the previous three elections, the 
constituency was then judged to be safe for that party.11 The constituencies considered safe in the 
next election were constructed in the same way by adding the next election outcome and dropping 
the oldest to form the relevant test distribution. Applying this algorithm to all constituencies in each 
election, we find the proportion of all constituencies that are considered to be safe in each election, 
𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡, and compute the proportion of marginal constituencies (in the total to be elected) in each election 
as MCons_SDt, =  1 −  𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡.  Finally, we acknowledge the importance of how safe constituencies are 
distributed across the parties to the contestability of an election and adjust the proportion of 
marginal seats by the degree of their asymmetry among the parties by using a Euclidean measure of 
the deviation of the proportion of safe constituencies from a three party equal sharing, 𝜙𝜙𝑡𝑡.  A final 
allowance for redistricting then produces our measure of contestability at the national level, 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴_𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 1 − 𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡𝜙𝜙𝑡𝑡.  
Lastly the ability of the governing party to maintain effective control over its elected members 
relative to the specific wishes of the constituency/candidate will depend in part on how intense is 
the level of competition at the constituency level.12 A larger expected margin of victory means that 
the incumbent candidate will be less reliant on the help of the national party and so less likely to 
conform to the election platform adopted by the party.  Greater competition in the constituency 
                                                          
10 See the data appendix for greater detail on how this index was constructed.  
11 Because the definition of volatility requires margin measures from three consecutive past election outcomes, 
the gradual addition of new ridings and constant redistricting create problems for consistency.  Hence we used 
unchanging geographical areas to define ‘super-constituencies’ across which measures of volatility are defined.  
This is an important feature of many of our constructs and is discussed more fully in the data appendix.  
12 Candidates with larger winning margins are less capable of being coerced into supporting party projects at the 
expense of personal/constituency plans making it harder for the party to engage in restrictive spending measures 
that are beneficial to the country as a whole (versus more expansive spending programs that provide constituency 
specific benefits). 
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then forces a broadening of the candidate’s political base and makes the individual member to 
more willingly to bear the short run cost of such policies as financial stringency and spending 
discipline that require individual constituency interests to give way to the national interest. This in 
turn allows the party to better serve the broader general public by moderating the strength of the 
common pool problem that arises in an electoral system based on geographically defined 
constituencies (where it is always in the narrow self-interest of elected members to deliver benefits 
to his or her constituents with taxes levied on taxpayers in the country as a whole).13  
Our measure of electoral competition among the candidates/ parties at the constituency level is the 
Przeworski/Sprague Index (1971, hereafter PS).  This index is constructed on the premise that the 
primary objective of each candidate is to overcome the vote gap it faces relative to the incumbent.  
The constituency based index is constructed as one over the vote weighted sum of the volatility 
adjusted vote gaps of each candidate and a national index is constructed as the sum of each 
constituency’s PS weighted by its vote share of the national total. The result is a metric where PS = 1 
indicates a fully competitive constituency election (no vote gap to overcome) whereas a PS = 0 
indicates one that was completely uncompetitive.14   
--insert Figure 1 around here -- 
The statistical properties of our four measures of political competition—the size of the majority 
party in the house (LNSEATS), the interaction of the coefficient of variation of their volatility 
adjusted winning margins with LNSEATS (INTER_LNSEATS), the Przeworski/Sprague index of 
electoral competition at the constituency level (PS_Adapt_Cons) and the degree of party 
contestability (Adj_AMCons_SD)—are included with the other economic variables in Table A1 of the 
Data Appendix of the paper.  What is important to note is that on the basis of the critical values of 
the adjusted Dickey-Fuller statistic, most of the economic variables are found to be nonstationary  
and most of the political variables are found to be nonstationary.  INTER_LNSEATS is the political 
variable exception being nonstationary while LNDEFICIT and FCOST (to be defined shortly) are the 
only two economic variables found to be stationary. None are I(2).  Table A2 of the Data Appendix 
shows the partial correlations arising among our political competition variables over our time 
period and reveals them to be positively correlated but not highly so. The partial correlations run 
from a low of .071 between LNSEATS and Adj_AMCons_SD to a high of .407 arising between 
PS_Adapt_Cons and Adj_AMCons_SD.  The other four combinations range between .227 and .291.   
It is because the ARDL model is designed to assess whether or not a long run cointegration 
(equilibrium) relationship exists among a group of variables when the orders of integration are 
                                                          
13 On the common pool problem in majoritarian electoral systems, see Tullock (1959) and Buchanan and Tullock 
(1963).  
14 Many of the early constituency elections in Canada featured a winner by acclamation and thus were given a 
constituency PS = 0. For more detail on the complexity of the construction of the volatility and PS indexes see the 
Data appendix and associated web site.  
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ambiguous and the sample size is small that the framework established in Pesaran, Shin and Smith 
(2001) is ideally suited to our problem.  It is implemented using the ARDL module in Eviews 10.  
3. Financial Stability 
We begin our analysis of the effects of these four aspects of political competition on Canada’s fiscal 
structure by examining their effect on fiscal stability. By fiscal stability we mean whether the state is 
financially sound in the sense that expenditures over the longer run are fully funded so that the 
long run fiscal objectives of government can be pursued without having to deal with the burden of 
ever escalating government debt.  This need not mean that the annual budget is balanced period by 
period but that over the long run expected tax revenues are sufficient to cover all planned 
expenditures.  Canada’s history of federal government noninterest spending and tax revenue as a 
proportion of GDP is presented in Figure 1.  Here the addition to outstanding federal government 
debt -- the primary deficit or surplus – appears as the difference between the solid and dashed 
lines.15 As can be seen from the diagram, the difference is not one sided; debt as a proportion of 
GDP does not appear to be rising despite ever rising levels of expenditure and some extended 
periods of primary deficits.  Perhaps the most noticeable characteristic is that payment for war-time 
expenditure is typically spread over time, both through the war years and the decade that follows.  
The diagram does capture the key characteristic that while federal government debt may have risen 
and fallen over time, fear that the rapid escalation in government debt would lead to insolvency has 
rarely been a concern in Canada’s history. 
 
--insert Figure 1 around here-- 
 
A more formal test for the long run stability of Canadian public finances begins from the definition 
that the level of debt in an economy is sustainable if the share of debt in aggregate income/output, 
𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡, does not grow through time (i.e., 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  1𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 . 𝜕𝜕𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡 ≤ 0).16  Then, defining 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 = 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡, where 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 is the 
nominal level of government debt, 𝑝𝑝 𝑡𝑡 is the price level, and 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 is the level of real income/output 
and taking its time derivative we find: 
 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡
1
𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡
= �𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡
1
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
� − �
𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡
1
𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡
� − �
𝑑𝑑𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡
1
𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡
�.                                                       (1) 
 
                                                          
15 This section extends work begun in Ferris, Winer and Grofman (2012). See that article for an extended discussion 
of institutional structure that was the focus of that work.   
16 Note that this is a sufficient rather than necessary condition, the necessary condition being that the present value 
of government debt goes to zero over time.  The advantage of using this stronger sufficient condition is that it yields 
a more transparent testable hypothesis.  
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Because the change in nominal government debt through time, 𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡
, equals the difference between 
total government spending and current tax revenues 𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡, where total spending depends upon both 
program spending 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡  and interest on outstanding government debt 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡, (1) can be written as,    
 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡
1
𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡
= �𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡−𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡+𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
� − 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡 − �
𝑑𝑑𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡
1
𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡
� = �𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡−𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
� + 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 − �𝑑𝑑𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 1𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡� .   (2) 
 
where �𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡−𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
� is the operating or primary deficit as a fraction of total debt and 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 and 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡 represent, 
respectively, the real rate of interest and the inflation rate. For the share of government debt in 
GDP to be both positive and not increasing in the long run, 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 must be a constant, ?̅?𝐴, and hence the 
growth rate of 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 must be zero, i.e.,  
1
𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡
. 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡
= 0.  Setting (2) equal to zero, imposing the constancy 
of 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 and dividing the top and bottom of the right hand side by nominal income, 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 = 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡, we find:  
  
�
𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡
𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡
� = �𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡
𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡
� + �𝑑𝑑𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡
1
𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡
− 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡� ?̅?𝐴.         (3) 
 
This relationship asserts that for the share of government debt in GDP to be remain constant in the 
long run there must exist a particular long run relationship among three variables, GSIZE =  Gt / Yt,  
TSIZE =  Tt / Yt, and the fiscal cost of long run debt, FCOSTt = �𝑑𝑑𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡
1
𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡
− 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡�.  Intuitively, a positive 
primary deficit (GSIZE – TSIZE) can be sustained in the long run without increasing the debt to GDP 
ratio only if the average rate of growth of real output exceeds the long run real cost of holding 
outstanding debt. 
 
In Canada’s case, FCOST has been stationary or I(0) over time.  This implies that because both GSIZE 
and TSIZE are nonstationary or I(1), long run fiscal stability requires GSIZE = TSIZE.  The sustainability 
of government debt in the long run can be then be tested for through the form and coefficients of 
the following regression: 
 
 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 �𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡
𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡
� =   𝑐𝑐0 + 𝑐𝑐1𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 �𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡� + 𝑐𝑐2𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 .                             (4) 
 
The sufficient condition for long run fiscal sustainability, that the debt to income ratio not grow 
over time, requires the regression residuals in (4) to be stationary and 𝑐𝑐1 = 1 . With FCOST 
stationary, 𝑐𝑐0 = 0 is consistent with 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 remaining a long run constant.17 
 
 [Table 1 here] 
 
                                                          
17 The stationarity of FCOST means that variations in its level produce transitory effects on the relationship 
between government expenditure and tax size, but have no permanent or long run effect. Hence the effect of 
FCOST, if any, should show up in the short run or error correction level of analysis. See Table 1 below.  
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An ARDL model of equation (4) was estimated using the Schwarz criterion to select optimal lag 
length for each of the model’s variables (up to a maximum of 4 lags per variable) and the optimal 
ARDL model is presented as Table 1.  The full ARDL model estimated on this basis is presented in 
column (1), with the implied long run cointegrating relation and the short run error correction 
process appearing as columns (2) and (3).  Using period dummies to offset a number of period 
outliers, the ARDL equation passes two stability tests: the cumulative sum of recursive residuals 
(CUSUM) and the cumulative sum of squares (CUSUM of Squares). In each case the recursive sums 
remain within the 5 percent bounds. The value found for the Bounds test (8.81), presented in the 
bottom line of the second column, implies that the long run equation is consistent with 
cointegration arising among the I(1) variables and thus with the existence of a long run equilibrium 
relationship.  The short run process about the long run is presented in column (3) together with the 
error correction term.  The latter is significantly negative but small in size, confirming convergence 
to the long run while indicating that the speed of convergence to that long run will be relatively 
slow.  
The coefficient estimates of the long run cointegrating equation in column (2) meet the sufficient 
conditions for long run fiscal sustainability in Canada.  The coefficient estimate on LNTSIZE is 1.002, 
insignificantly different from 1, with the coefficient estimate on FCOST and the regression constant 
both insignificantly different from zero.  Together these imply the existence of fiscal stability in 
Canada in the sense that federal government deficits are stationary such that debt as a fraction of 
GDP has not accelerated over the entire post-Confederation time period.18  
 The short run is also informative.  In particular while FCOST has had no long run effect on the 
growth rate of government debt, it is highly significant in the short run.  That is transitory increases 
in the real rate of growth relative to the real rate of interest are associated with transitory surpluses 
as revenues tied to income grow faster than spending.  As is the case at present in Canada, growth 
rates are often relied upon to resolve deficits arising from countercyclical spending and tax activity.  
Finally the short run also points to 1920, WW1, 1942 and 1946 as years producing exceptionally 
strong positive and negative shocks to federal government debt.   
Given the stationary behaviour of federal deficits/surpluses, it might be thought that there would 
be little room for variations in political competition to have played much of a role with respect to 
fiscal stability. To test this hypothesis we reran the ARDL model adding the political competition 
variables as potential explanatory variables.  Doing so revealed that the relatively high degree of 
correlation between PS_Adapt_Cons and Adj_AMCons_SD resulted in an underestimate of the 
                                                          
18 While the emphasis this paper is on the election process and its effects on political competition, Ferris, Winer 
and Grofman (2012) consider the effect of a set of organizational/institutional changes in the alignment of 
decision-making incentives and responsibility within the Canadian governance system for fiscal stability. Two 
episodes of institutional reorganization are found to have altered the chain of responsibility for economic policy 
that first weaken and then strengthen financial stability: the founding of the Bank of Canada in 1935 that led to the 
division of fiscal responsibility between the Department of Finance (fiscal policy) and the Bank (monetary policy); 
whereas the adoption of inflation targeting in 1991 targeted the central bank with responsibility for inflation 
control (rather than real output or unemployment). 
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significance of either individual contribution leading us to drop, Adj_AMCons_SD, as an 
independent indicator of the degree of electoral competition.  The estimation results using the 
remaining three political competition indicators are presented as columns (4) through (6) in Table 1.   
Inspection of the full ARDL equation in column (4) suggests that aside from indicating somewhat 
more persistence through time, the introduction of the political competition variables has not 
altered any of the previous findings.  The value of the Bounds test for cointegration (5.04), found at 
the bottom of column (4), is again consistent with the existence of a cointegrating relationship 
arising among the I(1) variables which in turn allows us to interpret the linear relationship described 
in column (5) as a long run equilibrium relationship.  The coefficient on LNTSIZE is now estimated as 
somewhat smaller (0.919) but still insignificantly different from 1, and the FCOST coefficient and 
regression constant remain insignificantly different from zero.  The error correction coefficient and 
short run adjustment path shown in column (6) again imply convergence back to the equilibrium 
time path with a speed of adjustment that is unchanged from that estimated earlier.  Finally, the 
ARDL equation passes the CUSUM and CUSUM of squares test for stability with the equation 
residuals remaining within the 5% bounds.   
The significance of the three political competition measures in the long run relationship of column 
(5) mean that variations in the degree of political competition have had a significant effect on fiscal 
stability over time. That is, to the extent that decreases in the proportion of seats held by the 
governing party, LNSEATS, and increases in the degree of electoral competition with constituencies, 
PS_Adapt_Cons, mean increased political competition, the signs of the coefficient estimates are all 
consistent with greater political competition decreasing the gap between government spending and 
taxes over the long run and hence improving fiscal stability.  Note, however, that because these 
metrics are both stationary, there has been no trend, so that significance implies a reduction in the 
scale of the residual about the cointegrating equation.  Periods in which the size of the governing 
majority has been smaller than average and the degree of competition within constituencies has 
been higher than average are then consistently associated with smaller levels of government 
spending and/or higher levels of taxation.  While the sign of the coefficient estimate on our third 
political variable, the interaction of LNSEATS with CV_winning margin, is consistent with the 
hypothesis that a wider distribution of winning margins increases the responsiveness of the party to 
the voting public, the coefficient estimate is also insignificantly different from zero.   
To summarize the primary results of this section, the data provides strong evidence of fiscal stability 
in the post Confederation period for Canada.  Primary fiscal deficits are stationary and the indicated 
response to the appearance of a deficit is consistent with net spending changes to affect its removal 
and thus produce convergence to a stable long run debt to GDP ratio.  The enhanced ARDL model 
provides evidence that at least two of our four measures of political competition are consistent 
with greater competition enhancing the fiscal responsibility of Canada’s federal governments.  
Governing terms that are characterized by smaller seat majorities are associated with less fiscal 
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spending and smaller sized deficits while periods of greater electoral competition within the 
constituency have served to enhance fiscal stability.  
4. Political Competitiveness and Government Expenditure and Tax Size 
4.1. Modelling a Fiscal Policy Instruments under Financial Stability 
When fiscal policy instruments are discussed, attention is most often focused on three interrelated 
policy decisions: government spending, taxation and deficits.  Hence we describe the movement of 
the fiscal variables in our analysis as a structural simultaneous equation model of the long and short run 
dimensions of our three fiscal instruments—government expenditure size, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 =  log (𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡⁄ ), tax 
size, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 = log(𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡⁄ ), and the deficit, ∆𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡 = 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 −  𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡.  We keep the form of the 
autoregressive distributive lag model as general as possible to allow for all possible influences on, and all 
potential determinants of, short and long run policy.19 Hence we assume that at time t the government 
sector of the economy can be described by the following annual system of equations: 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝛼2𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼3𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝛼4∆𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼5∆𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝛼6𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 
 +𝛼𝛼7𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝛼8𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼9𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑔𝑔           (5) 
 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽4∆𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽5∆𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽6𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 
 +𝛽𝛽7𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽8𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽9𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡           (6) 
 
and ∆𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡 ≡ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 − 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡                               (7) 
where 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 is a vector of economic fundamentals and 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 is the vector of the political competition 
variables discussed above and where both are treated as co-determinants of 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 and 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡.  Here 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡
𝑔𝑔 and  𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 are viewed as white noise random variables.  
What is immediately apparent is that since ∆𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡 ≡ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 − 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡   ∀ 𝑡𝑡, the three equations 
cannot be linearly independent even in the short run.  By substituting (7) back into the two earlier 
equations we can reduce the system to two equations that can be independent (at least in the short 
run).  Unfortunately the resulting two equation system solves for 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 and 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 
simultaneously and this implies that the regression estimates on the contemporaneous terms of 
each separate equation will be inconsistent and likely biased.  This issue is overcome by the 
substitution of one equation into the other and solving for the reduced form where each fiscal 
variable is a function only of the lagged values of all the political and economic variables and 
themselves.  Representing the composite terms with a new set of coefficients and by adding and 
subtracting lagged variables, the two equation system can be written in terms of lagged variables and 
first differences and then rearranged to represent the short and long run versions of the system in error 
correction form. That is, after rearranging, an error correction form can be written as, 
                                                          
19 Later ARDL estimation will allow for up to four lags of all covariates.  
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∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 = (𝑎𝑎1 − 1) �𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝑎𝑎0(1 − 𝑎𝑎1) − (𝑎𝑎4 + 𝑎𝑎3)(1 − 𝑎𝑎1) 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1 − (𝑎𝑎6 + 𝑎𝑎5)(1 − 𝑎𝑎1) 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝑎𝑎2(1 − 𝑎𝑎1) 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1� + (𝑎𝑎1 − 1)∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑎𝑎2∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑎𝑎3∆𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 + (𝑎𝑎4 + 𝑎𝑎3)∆𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑎𝑎5∆𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 + (𝑎𝑎6 + 𝑎𝑎5)∆𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡𝑔𝑔,   (8) 
 ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 = (𝑏𝑏1 − 1) �𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝑏𝑏0(1−𝑏𝑏1) − (𝑏𝑏4+𝑏𝑏3)(1−𝑏𝑏1) 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1 − (𝑏𝑏6+𝑏𝑏5)(1−𝑏𝑏1) 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝑏𝑏2(1−𝑏𝑏1) 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1� + (𝑏𝑏1 − 1)∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑏𝑏2∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑏𝑏3∆𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 + (𝑏𝑏4 + 𝑏𝑏3)𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑏𝑏5∆𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 + (𝑏𝑏6 + 𝑏𝑏5)𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡  .          (9)   
If the model is stable, in the long run the two terms in squared brackets must disappear (the 
deviation from the long run equilibrium path becomes zero) and, as we have seen, the Canadian 
fiscal structure is consistent with long run fiscal stability.  In this case ∆𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡∗ = 0 or 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡∗ =
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡
∗.  Imposing this condition on (8) and (9) we find the long run solutions: 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡
∗ = 𝑎𝑎0(1−𝑎𝑎1) + (𝑎𝑎4+𝑎𝑎3)(1−𝑎𝑎1) 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡∗ + (𝑎𝑎6+𝑎𝑎5)(1−𝑎𝑎1) 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡∗       (10) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡
∗ = 𝑏𝑏0(1−𝑏𝑏1) + (𝑏𝑏4+𝑏𝑏3)(1−𝑏𝑏1) 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡∗ + (𝑏𝑏6+𝑏𝑏5)(1−𝑏𝑏1) 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡∗         (11) 
with ∆𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡∗ = 0.           (12) 
In the empirical section below we follow Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001) and estimate an ARDL model 
that allows for the separation of the long run equilibrium time path from the short run adjustment and 
error correction processes. 
4.2 Economic Fundamentals as control variables 
The role of political competition in relation to both the long run size of government and short run 
countercyclical fiscal intervention is analyzed within a model where long run size is based on 
economic fundamentals and its short run variation is based on adjustments to changing economic 
fundamentals and random shocks (see also Ferris, Park and Winer, 2008).  Below we present the 
variables used to proxy these fundamentals. Despite the widespread availability of data for Canada, 
the variables that can be used to proxy economic fundamentals are limited by their need to span 
the entire one hundred and forty-five year period following Confederation.  Subject to this 
restriction, the variables chosen reflect those often discussed in the growth of government 
literature and hence are widely used in the study of government size in (developed) democratic 
states.20   
The traditional starting point in explaining government size is Wagner’s Law, the hypothesis that the 
size and scope of government increases more than in proportion with society’s growth in scale and 
complexity. This is interpreted as implying an elasticity of real per capita income (RGDPPC) with 
respect to size that is positive.  To capture other structural features that may have promoted more 
                                                          
20  For a more detailed discussion see Winer and Ferris (2008).  Other papers using similar variables include: 
Borcherding (1985); Mueller (1986); Payne and Ewing (1996); and Borcherding, Ferris and Garzoni (2004). 
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(or less) government involvement in the Canadian economy, we use the immigration rate 
(IMRATIO) and the openness of the economy through the relative size of foreign trade in GDP 
(OPEN).  Immigration has played a major role throughout Canadian history, especially before WWI 
and in the decade following WWII.  The use of OPEN in relation to government size tests Rodrik’s 
(1998) hypothesis that greater openness leads to more government as a form of insurance against 
external shocks relative to the competing view that openness restrains government size by 
imposing more external constraints on feasible levels of taxation (Borcherding et al 2004, Ferris et 
al 2008).21   
Urbanization is a structural feature suggested by Kau and Rubin (1981) as a constraint on the ability 
of the government to tax effectively.  Because urbanization is unavailable for our entire time period, 
we utilize its inverse - the percentage of the population in agriculture (AGRIC) and hence predict a 
negative relationship with size.  Many studies of the long run size of government also find that the 
age structure of the population matters and use for this purpose the proportion of the population 
that is sixty-five or older (Cukierman and Meltzer, 1989; Ferris and West, 1996). For Canada, from 
1870 onward, we have available only the proportion of the population that is less than 16 years old 
or younger (YOUNG).  This we expect to exert upward pressure on government size through 
increased demand for government provided health and public schooling.22 Finally another look at 
Figure 1 indicates clearly that the two world wars have had a dramatic effect on government 
spending.  Hence dummy variables for WW1 (1914-1918) and WW2 (1939-1945) were developed 
and used.  
With the exception of the world war and year dummies, all of the economic variables are used in 
log form, indicated as such in the tables by the addition of the prefix LN to the variable names.23 
The descriptive statistics for these variables are presented in the Data Appendix where it is noted 
that together with LNGSIZE and LNTSIZE, the explanatory variables used in the long run model of 
government size are typically nonstationary in levels and stationary in first differences. 
4.3. Political Competition and Long Run Government Size 
In columns (1) through (4) of Table 2 we present the best fitting versions of the ARDL models of 
expenditure size while columns (5) through (8) present the corresponding versions for Canada’s 
federal tax/revenue size.  All equations work well explaining over ninety five percent of the 
variation in government size.  In each set of size groupings, the equations in the first two columns 
use only economic and demographic fundamentals as determinants of size while the second set of 
two add the political competition variables to the fundamental controls.  In all cases the Bounds 
                                                          
21  Population size is often included to test for economies of scale. As is common with much of the literature, we 
find no evidence of economies of scale in the provision of government services.     
22 Although health and education are a provincial responsibility in Canada, the federal government provides 
considerable funding for these services though intergovernmental transfers. 
23 GSIZE, TSIZE, IMRATIO, AGRIC, YOUNG, OPEN and SEATS are all fractions constrained to lie between zero and 
one.  Hence transforming these variables into percentages and logarithms avoids restrictions on the domain of the 
error terms in our estimating equations. 
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test statistics (shown at the bottom of each long run column) are consistent with the existence of a 
cointegrating relationship arising among the I(1) covariates.  The long run cointegrating equations 
implied by each ARDL model are then presented in odd columns, (1) through (7), followed by their 
corresponding short run adjustment and error correction processes in the even columns (2) through 
(8).  The error correction coefficients (shaded and found at the bottom of the short run columns) 
are all significantly negative, implying convergence back to the estimated equilibrium time path. 
Hence both shocks and covariate changes that produce deviations from the equilibrium time path 
are transitory, reacted to in a way that brings government size converging back to its long run 
equilibrium. Both models are similar in pointing to WW2 as a period of extraordinary changes in 
expenditures and taxes change but differ in other years that appear as large outliers.24 Accounting 
for the specificity of these short run effects results in a stable ARDL model where the equation 
residuals all remain within the bounds of the standard CUSUM and CUSUM squared tests.25   
-- insert Table 2 about here -- 
In both long run models, the relationships found between the different variables used to proxy 
economic fundamentals and government size conform to expectation.  The trending reduction in 
agriculture’s share of production (corresponding to an increase in urbanization and industrialism) is 
associated with a larger government size, but only weakly so.  On the other hand, increases in the 
share of the population that is young and increases in real GDP per capita, on the other hand are 
both associated significantly with increases in both the expenditure and tax measure of government 
size.  Hence the evidence is strongly consistent with Wagner’s Law holding for Canada while periods 
of baby boom (busts) are met with greater (less) than proportional expansions in both spending and 
taxes.  Periods with larger immigration flows have a similarly signed negative effect on both 
expenditure and tax sizes of government but are found to be significant only on the tax side. Finally 
the data is inconsistent with Rodrik’s (1998) hypothesis that greater trading openness promotes a 
larger sized government.  In Canada’s case, the data is more consistent with the competing 
hypothesis that greater openness has constrained government size by limiting the ability of 
governments to tax traded goods, workers and capital differentially in the presence of low cost 
mobility across adjacent borders.  
The addition of the four political competition variables does improve significantly the fit of the 
equations and generate results that are consistent with political competition reducing political 
rents.  The results are shown in columns (3-4) for expenditure size and (7-8) for tax size. A Wald test 
of the hypothesis that the four political competition variables have no effect on LNGSIZE can be 
rejected, with the probability that the political competition variables have no effect equal to 0.004.  
A similar Wald test on LNTSIZE finds the probability that the political competition variables have no 
effect is even smaller at 0.0001.  Of the four different measures of political competitiveness, by far 
the metric that has the most significant long run effect on both measures of size is LNSEATS (an 
elasticity of 0.820 for its effect on expenditure and 0.538 for taxation).  That is, the data indicates 
                                                          
24 Note that 1920 was the year leading into the 14th general election which was the first federal election in which 
women could vote following the extension of the franchise in 1917, 1930 was the first year of the Great 
Depression in Canada and 1942 (1946) was the mid (end)-point in Canada’s WW2 participation. 
25 To economize on space these graphs are not presented but are available upon request. 
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that the larger is the seat majority held by the winning political party in the House (independent of 
party type), the larger are both measures of government size. This is consistent with the hypothesis 
that because parties with larger governing majorities face less effective opposition in the legislature 
and hence have more opportunity to realize political rents by extending government expenditures. 
The data also indicate that the expansion in expenditure size has been financed not just by raising 
the level of current taxation but also by spreading tax increases over later generations through 
increased sized deficits.  There is little suggestion, however, that a widening of the distribution of 
the governing party’s winning margins (INTER_LNSEATS) has any long run constraining effect on 
government’s expenditure or tax size.  To the extent that a wider distribution of constituency 
winning margins indicates less party unity and a proportionally larger number of members 
interested in ‘public’ versus ‘private’ interests, the negative coefficient estimated for its effect is 
found to be insignificantly different from zero.   
While greater competition in the house appears to be effective in constraining political rent seeking 
by restraining both measures of government size, the effect of greater electoral competition among 
the candidates within each constituencies (PS_Adapt_Cons) is somewhat different.  That is greater 
electoral competition within the constituencies is associated with smaller government expenditures 
(-1.006) but with larger rather than smaller taxes (0.967).  To the extent that greater inter-riding 
competition increases the candidates reliance on their party, the governing party appears better 
able to restrain constituency rent-seeking by restraining overall spending and enhancing fiscal 
stability by raising taxes.  
Finally, our measure of the degree of contestability in the federal election (Adj_AMCons_SD) has 
had no significant effect on the expenditure size of Canada’s federal government. It does, however, 
have a significant effect on the revenue/tax size of government (-0.524).  Reductions in the number 
and/or greater asymmetry in how safe constituencies are distributed across competing parties is 
met with a decrease in the tax size of government. Put differently, increases in the number and or 
symmetry of marginal seats in a federal election that make the election more contestable among 
the competing major parties and are reflected in tax reductions rather than spending increases. 
4.4 Short Run Variations in Government Size and Countercyclical Intervention 
One advantage of ARDL modeling is that by separating the long run from the short run relationship 
arising in the same data series, ARDL outcomes can indicate which variables have power in the long 
versus short run and allow for same relationship to indicate a different role in the short run as 
opposed to the long run.  One such example of the latter that stands out in our data is the 
relationship arising between the two measures of government size (LNGsize and LNTsize) and real 
income per capita (LNRGDPPC).  For example, in columns (1) and (3), the data indicate that there is 
a strong positive long run relationship arising between the two measures. However, in columns (2) 
and (4) the data indicate that in the short run both measures of government size vary inversely with 
real income per capita, with dramatically different signs and relatively large elasticity values.  Rather 
than being consistent with the long relationship implied by Wagner’s Law or government size being 
complementary private output, the short run relationship appearing in the data is more consistent 
with government spending and public debt playing a countercyclical role in relation to the business 
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cycle.  That is as real per capita income rises (falls), government spending decreases (increases) 
concurrently, with that decrease (increase) reversing as earlier as the following period.  
Government tax size, on the other hand, tends to be somewhat procyclical, increasing rather than 
falling relative to per capita income. Overall, however, short run fiscal policy is stimulating in its 
effect rather than contractionary, with transitory countercyclical changes in spending dominating 
smaller changes in taxes.  Finally, the addition of the political variables appears to increase 
somewhat the stimulative effect of short run fiscal policy.  The countercyclical response in 
government spending to a decrease in per capita income is larger (-.783 versus .708)  while the 
procyclical response of taxation is smaller (-310 versus -.332).  
A second feature of interest is that INTER_LNSEAT, the interaction of LNSEATS with CV_gov_party, 
is the only one of the political variables that is significant in the short run adjustment process. 
Because INTER_LNSEATS is insignificant over the long run and presents only offsetting significance 
across successive lags, the data suggest that a wider distribution of volatility adjusted winning 
margins across the constituencies won by the governing party does create temporary disruption to 
the plans of the governing party, but that these are transitory in nature, not surviving into the long 
run.  Of the economic variables, only immigration flows, IMRATIO, are found to be significant.  As 
was the case with LNRGDPPC, the sign of their effect is different in the short run from that found for 
the long run.  In the case of immigration, the data suggest that in the short run larger immigration 
flows result in a larger tax sized government while over the long run both expenditure and tax sizes 
are significantly smaller. 
Finally, while we have seen that the negative signs on the error correction term in all four sets of 
equations are consistent with convergence back to the cointegrating equation, it is important to 
note that the absolute size of the error correction coefficient estimates has increased with the 
introduction of the political competition variables.  In the case of expenditure size, the error 
correction coefficient falls in size from -0.177 to -0.242, where the 0.065 difference is more than 
twice the standard error of 0.026.  The result for convergence on the tax side is similar.  The error 
correction coefficient falls in size from -0.108 to -0.180, with the 0.072 difference more than four 
times larger than the 0.015 standard error. 
In summary the introduction of our set of political competition variables into these ARDL models of 
government size generates results that are consistent with the following hypotheses. Increases in 
political competition, as measured by changes in our four indices, are consistent with a) a reduction 
in the scale of political rents as measured by a reduction the gap between the actual expenditure 
and tax sizes of government and that implied by our set of economic fundamentals, b) improving 
the speed of convergence on the long run by increasing the rate at which short run departures 
return to the long run equilibrium path set by fundamentals, c) increasing the fiscal response to the 
business cycle and d) increasing financial stability by  bringing closer together government spending 
and revenue plans and stabilizing government debt.  It should also be noted that while all of our 
measures of political competition work in some way to support these hypotheses, each measure 
exhibits a slightly different focus.  For example some metrics exhibit an effect on only one 
dimension of policy--Adj_AMCons_SD has a significant influence only the tax size of government 
while INTER_LNSEATS appears significant in the short run alone.  On the other hand, the significant 
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appearance of LNSEATS throughout the analysis is supportive of a modified version of the 
hypothesis recently advance by Cox and Weingast (2017) that ‘the health of the legislature’ is at 
least as important as ‘the health of the election’.  Here the moderating ‘at least as’ comes from the 
equivalent significance of the degree of electoral competition among the candidates at the 
constituency level in all our measures of fiscal structure.  
5. Political Competition, the Operating Deficit and the Business Cycle 
While the response of the deficit to the political competition variables is implicit in the results of 
Tables 1 and 2, it is insightful to focus explicitly on how the operating deficit of the federal 
government itself responds to the business cycle and the political variables. Because the deficit is 
stationary, we relate the deficit to the set of stationary political variables, LNSEATS, PS_Adapt_Cons 
and Adj_AMCons_SD (together with the first difference of the nonstationary interactive political 
variable, D(INTER_LNSEATS)) and use the growth rate of real per capita output, GROWTH_RGDPPC, 
as our measure of the business cycle.26 As was the case with the other Tables, we first present the 
relationship without political variables and then add the political variables to the model. 
--Insert Table 3 about here– 
As the OLS regression result in column (1) makes apparent, the deficit varies inversely with changes 
in the growth rate, consistent with the earlier observation that the net of government spending and 
tax changes responds countercyclically to the business cycle.  The results also suggest that while the 
contemporaneous countercyclical response in the deficit is quickly offset as early as the following 
year, the persistence of deficits indicated in the regression means that any initial shock to the 
deficit size will initiate a prolonged change that will permit the level to return only slowly to its pre-
shock level.27     
The addition of the political variables in column (2) the previously estimates largely unchanged.  The 
persistence of LNDEFICIT to shocks across time remains statistically unaltered as does the 
coefficient estimate describing the correlation arising between the size of the deficit and the 
growth rate.28 On the other hand, the addition of the political variables does significantly increase 
the explanatory power of the regression.29 Moreover, two of our four political variables have 
coefficient estimates that have their predicted sign and are significantly different from zero. The 
data is then consistent with the hypotheses that a small governing majority, interpreted as greater 
competition in the legislature, and a greater average degree of electoral competition across 
constituencies reduces the size of the federal deficit. The data also suggest that there is a weak 
                                                          
26 The growth rate of GDP per capita is stationary about a constant growth rate of 2 percent over our time period. 
27  Causality is likely to run both ways in the relationship between government size and per capita output implying 
that the interpretation of the significant correlation found needs to be read with caution. However, because the 
effect of government size on output is expected to be positive, there is reason to believe that the size of the 
implied countercyclical response suggested above is understated rather than overstated.  See Ferris and Voia 
(2017, forthcoming).   
28 Although the estimates of the two growth coefficients are both larger absolutely, the differences in estimated 
size are both insignificantly different from zero.  
29 A Wald test of the hypothesis that the set of four political variables has no explanatory power can be rejected at 
the five percent significance level. 
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constraining effect of an increase in the dispersion of electoral support across the ridings won by 
the governing party and a weak expansionary effect associated with greater symmetry in safeness 
of constituencies across the contending major parties, but neither of these latter effects is 
significantly different from zero at conventional levels of significance.   
6. Does the level of political competition really matter?  The Debt Crisis of the late 1980s 
While the analysis thus far suggests that political competition has made a significant statistical 
impact on Canada’s fiscal structure, one can still ask whether there is any evidence to suggest that 
this statistical significance translates into an economically meaningful contribution to Canada’s 
fiscal performance?  In this section, then, we ask what practical difference would an increase in 
electoral competition have made to the federal debt crisis that arose in Canada in the 1980s and 
early 1990s.  Was political competition lacking during this period fiscal instability and, if so, would 
an increase in electoral competition have made an important difference to this fiscal outcome? 
In Figure 2 we plot, as the solid upper line, the actual log deficit size (as a proportion of GDP) of the 
federal government’s budget between the years 1975 and 1993.30 Over that time period, multiple 
years of high fiscal deficits, in combination with loose monetary policy, resulted in high rates of 
inflation and ultra high interest rates (hitting 21% in August 1982).  This in turn produced a vicious 
circle of federal borrowing, as high servicing costs required even higher levels of federal borrowing 
simply to maintain existing debt levels.  Together these factors produced a rapid growth in the 
outstanding stock of federal government debt, rising from 20 percent of GDP in 1971 to almost 60 
percent by the mid 1990s. While operating surpluses did begin earlier, it was only following the 
election of the Chrétien Liberal government in 1993 that an all-party consensus developed to tackle 
the federal debt issue allowing for a dramatic cut back in government hiring and the production of 
successive overall budget surpluses. 
--insert Figure 2 about here-- 
From the perspective of this paper we can ask what was happening to political competition over 
this interval by examining the actual performance of our political competition variables. In Figure 3 
we present the levels and movement of three of these variables relative to their means.  As the 
diagram suggests, the two election variables—PS_Adapt_Cons and Adj_AMS_SD (scaled on the left 
axis)-- were well below their overall mean for large parts of this period, while the third variable, 
LnSeats (scaled on the right axis), began the period just below its mean before rising well above for 
the latter half of the 1980s.  The similar time patterns exhibited by the two electoral competition 
measures imply that the degree of political competition within election constituencies and among 
competing national parties was well below normal from as early as 1976.  Competition intensity 
remained below average through the mid 1980s before slowly rising back to the long run in the late 
1980s.  The seat majority held by the governing party, on the other hand, entered the period below 
its mean but, following the Mulroney election of 1984, rose well above its mean for the remainder 
of the 1980s before falling back to the mean by the early 1990s. This indication of a reduction in 
competition within the legislature arose at a time to counter the low but slowly rising level of 
                                                          
30 Here LNDEFICIT = LNGSIZE – LNTSIZE where government spending does not include interest payments. 
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political competition in the elections. Thus while the two sets of measures differed in the specific 
time intervals in which a lack of competition was indicated, in combination they imply that overall 
the level of competition in federal elections and in the resulting legislatures was less than usual 
throughout.  Political competition returned to normal for all our metrics only towards the end of 
our time period. 
To give a measure of the potential importance of electoral competition, we can ask what would 
have been the effect of an increase in the degree of political competition as measured by our 
model.  Would greater political competition have helped?  Using the long run coefficient estimates 
from Table 3, but raising the Przeworski-Sprague and the asymmetrically adjusted marginal seat 
indexes, while reducing the size of the seat majority held by the governing party and the coefficient 
of variation of its winning margins by 2 percent, we can generate a prediction of what the long run 
deficits/surpluses would have arisen had these dimensions of political competition been marginally 
improved and all other factors remained unchanged.  The different this two percent improvement 
in long run competitiveness would have made was then subtracted from actual LNDEFICITs.  The 
newly predicted pattern of the log differences in deficits is shown as the dashed line on Figure 2.   
--insert Figure 3 about here— 
The story told by this counterfactual is quite striking.  First it is important to recognize that a 
marginal increase in the average level of political competitiveness would not have changed the 
overall pattern of deficits arising over the period.  Rather the marginal increase in average 
competitiveness would have worked to shift the time path of deficits downwards.  As such the 
model suggests that greater competitiveness would not only have an important effect on the size of 
annual federal deficits but through this also alter favourably the growth rate of federal debt.  The 
model’s prediction suggests that federal government debt would have risen much more slowly, 
peaked at a much lower level, and began its decline from the peak size much earlier. 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper we have asked whether political competition, measured in four different ways, has 
played any significant role in explaining variations in four different dimensions of the Government 
of Canada’s fiscal structure—its financial stability, its expenditure and tax sizes, and countercyclical 
policy.  The short answer is that political competition so measured has played a significant role in 
relation to all of these fiscal measures, with significant correlations found arising between the two 
sets of measures consistent with the hypothesis that greater political competition reduces the scale 
of governance externalities so enhancing the efficiency of the federal government. The likelihood 
that these fiscal policies and political competition have a two-way relationship leaves open only the 
question of the strength of this causal connection.  
The data are also interesting in their detail, suggesting that political competition may influence 
some dimensions of policy more than others and that different elements of political competition 
may work with some aspects of fiscal policy better than others, often in different ways.  For 
example, the data are consistent with the effects of political competition being strongest with 
respect to government size.  A fall in political competition as measured by an increase in the size of 
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the seat majority held by the governing party is associated with a significant increase in both the 
expenditure and tax sizes of government.  Here the increase in expenditure exceeds that of taxes 
resulting in a net increase in the deficit.  A similar reduction in the degree of electoral competition 
within Canada’s federal election ridings is associated with a more unambiguous increase in deficit 
size, the significant increase in spending now matched by a significant reduction in taxes. The other 
two measures of political competition are supportive of these results but less strongly so.  An 
increase in the proportion and/or asymmetry of safe seats, serving to weaken political competition, 
produces a significant increase in tax size alone while a decrease in the dispersion of volatility 
adjusted winning margins produces only a transitory increase in tax size.  In addition to indicating 
the importance of greater political competition encouraging the governing party to bring long run 
size closer to that desired by its principals, the data also suggest that a more competitive political 
environment would be beneficial, decreasing persistence by increasing the speed at which 
departures in government size converge back onto the time path indicated by underlying 
fundamentals.   
The tests for fiscal stability reveal that even without accounting for changes in our measures of 
political competition the data is consistent with long run financial stability.  Government spending is 
essentially equal to government revenue over the long run.  The introduction of three of the four 
measures of political competition does make it apparent, however, that variations in the degree of 
political competition have mattered.  Our application of the model to the period of apparent federal 
debt instability in the 1980s illustrates how smaller seat majorities in the House and greater degrees 
of electoral competition in the ridings and between contenting parties could have played an 
important role in minimizing the likelihood of fiscal instability.  
Finally, with respect to the business cycle, the data show that government spending is strongly pro-
cyclical while government revenue is weakly counter-cyclical.  Accounting for the effects of political 
competition suggests the size of both these effects is somewhat larger than otherwise. The former 
two effects are statistically significant, however, while the latter is not.  When the net effect on the 
deficit is examined, the data is consistent with deficits being strongly pro-cyclical.  Once again it is 
the size of the governing majority and the electoral competitiveness within ridings that are the two 
measures significantly associated with deficits, in this case both decreasing its average size.  In this 
sense greater political competition appears to affect the business cycle primarily by increasing the 
scale of spending and taxation while effectively maintaining discipline over the tendency for 
recessions to promote an upward creep in federal debt as a proportion of GDP.     
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Data Appendix 
The data for this study were collected over a long period of time from a wide variety of sources.  
The primary data together with a complete definition, description and sourcing of each variable are 
all available at the web site, http://www.carleton.ca/~winers. Here we present a short description 
of each variable followed by a table presenting the key statistical characteristics of each variable. 
D(.) = first different operator; LN(.)= logarithm indicator. 
LNGSIZE = log(GSIZE)=log[(noninterest federal government spending)/GDP], interest is on debt 
privately held. 
LNTSIZE = log(federal government revenues/GDP) 
VOLATILITY. Because the size of a winning vote margin is meaningful only in relation to the volatility 
of the constituency’s vote margin, we needed a measure of vote volatility over time. Then to avoid 
the loss of information when new constituencies were added or reformed (and hence have no past), we 
constructed a number of regional super-constituencies - 80 in total - based on geographic regions that 
persist throughout Canada’s election history for measures that required past election outcomes. These 
established regional specific vote volatilities for use in periods when a new constituency was created or 
an old one reshaped. To give one example, the area around Ottawa was used as the base for one of 29 
Ontario super-constituencies. Electorally it consisted of one 1 riding in 1867 and had risen to include 7 
ridings by 2011. A super-constituency volatility for each area and election was then computed as follows. 
First the average vote shares by party over the constituencies within a superconstituency were computed. 
Next the absolute value of the changes in these (party-specific) average vote shares across adjacent 
elections was computed, summed and divided by 2. Each of these super-constituency specific differences 
in vote shares were weighted by the relative number of constituencies inside each superconstituency and 
summed to derive an aggregate volatility number for each election. This volatility measure was then 
applied to vote margins whether a constituency was new or not.  
LNSEATS = log(% of seats held by the governing party in Parliament) 
AMCons = Asymmetric adjusted marginal constituencies = 1 - 𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡𝜙𝜙𝑡𝑡, where 𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡 is the proportion of 
safe constituencies in the previous election and 𝜙𝜙𝑡𝑡 is a Euclidean distance measure of asymmetry 
across the shares of safe seats.  Safeness is defined using a three-year moving measure of volatility 
and a 1 standard deviation test. Lower values of 𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡𝜙𝜙𝑡𝑡 indicate either that more constituencies have 
become marginal or that the distribution of marginal constituencies across parties has become 
more symmetrical.  In either case the election outcome has become less predictable ex ante.  See 
also the Data Appendix in Ferris, Winer and Grofman (2016).  
Adj_AMCons = AMCons adjusted for constituency redistributions.  Because redistricting and the 
addition of new constituencies were frequent in Canada’s electoral history, large numbers of 
constituencies will have no past history and hence no clear basis for assigning safeness.  However, 
since some new constituencies will be formed out of constituencies that were previously safe, we 
defined the safeness of new constituencies (at the aggregate level) as the proportion of all current 
constituencies that would otherwise have been treated as safe. That is rather than simply treating 
all redistributed seats as marginal or as equivalent in safeness to the proportion of safe seats in the 
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ongoing constituencies that did have incumbents, the set of redistributed constituencies were 
treated as being between these two extremes.  
CV_winmargint = the coefficient of variation of the volatility adjusted winning margins of the 
constituencies won by the political party that was governing following election t.  
PS_Adapt_Cons = the Przeworski and Sprague measure of competitiveness at the constituency level 
and is the sum of a weighted measure of the volatility adjusted vote margin that each party must 
overcome at the constituency level relative to the incumbent winning party.  To avoid the loss of 
data arising from acclamations and redistricting, the following conventions were adopted.  Party 
candidates winning by acclamation were given a vote-share of 1 and were awarded the national 
constituency average number of votes to weigh their significance relative to other constituencies.  
This resulted in an larger adjusted national vote as the new base for the calculation of adjusted 
constituency vote shares.  Redistributions were handled by creating pseudo-predecessor 
constituencies using the average vote shares of those parties of the constituencies (within the same 
super-constituency) that had been lost due to the redistricting. If the constituency was entirely new 
(no old constituencies were lost), the previous super-constituency average was used and if the 
super-constituency itself was new (as in the case of Newfoundland), the national average was used.  
The PS index runs between and 1 with higher values indicating a more competitive constituency.  
The PS version used in the text assumes adaptive expectations with an equal weight given to a one 
period historical past and contemporary outcomes.  For greater detail see Przeworski and Sprague 
(1971) and the accompanying web site http://www.carleton.ca/~winers.   
NOTE:  When converting from an election to an annual basis, elections held in the first half of a 
calendar year were assigned to the previous year to allow for pre-election effects. The competition 
in the house variables--LNSEATS and CV_winmargin—were held constant between elections while 
AMS and PS_Adapt_Cons were treated as snapshot pictures of an evolving level of political 
competition and so interpolated between election years.  
LNYOUNG = log(% of the population 17 and under). 
LNAGRIC = log(% of the labour force employed in agriculture) 
LNIMRATIO = log(immigrants as a percentage of the population) 
LNOPEN = log[(Export+Imports)/GDP] 
POP = population 
LNRGDPPC = log(RGDPPC) where RDGPPC = (GDP/(GDPdeflator*POP)) 
LNDEFICIT ≡ LNGSIZE – LNTSIZE 
WW1 = 1 in the years 1914 – 1918, 0 otherwise.  
WW2 = 1 in the years 1939 to 1945, 0 otherwise. 
D1920(30)(42)(46)(74) = 1 in year 1920(1930)(1942)(1946)(19740);  0 otherwise  
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Table A1 
Descriptive Statistics for Canada: 1870 - 2015 
Variable Mean Maximum Minimum Standard deviation 
ADF statistic 
Level-constant (Difference) 
LNGSIZE 2.273 3.767 1.251 0.597 -1.836 (-7.58***) 
LNTSIZE 2.357 3.242 1.524 0.517 -1.551 (-7.65***) 
LNDEFICIT  -0.084 0.632 -0.663 0.252 -7.85*** 
FCOST 1.05 17.79 -27.55 7.15 -7.22*** 
LNSEATS 4.065 4.363 3.696 0.155 -4.967*** 
Adj_AMCons 0.847 1.00 0.594 0.151 -6.42*** 
INTER_LNSEATS 7.244 30.23 2.80 6.527 -1.97 (-10.53***) 
PS_ADAPT_CONS 0.655 0.807 0.443 0.088 -3.74***  
LNAGRIC 2.704 4.016 0.545 1.163 1.83 (-8.107*** trend)  
LNIMRATIO -0.300 1.659 -2.679 0.865 -2.54 (-10.07***) 
LNOPEN 3.815 4.448 3.430 0.244 -1.949 (-9.08***) 
LNRGDPPC 8.917 10.257 7.395 0.862 -0.704  (-9.030***) 
GROWTH_RGDPPC 0.020 0.145 -0.134 0.049 -9.030 
MacKinnon critical 1% value…-3.48; Probability of having a unit root….1% (5%)[10%, *** (**)[*] 
Note that LNSEATS and CV_winmargin change discretely at each election interval, while Adj_AMS and PS_CANDIDATE are interpolated between 
elections to reflect the ever-changing intensity of their form of political competition between the snapshot pictures captured at the time of 
each election. 
Table A2 
Correlations among Political Competition Measures 
 Adj_AMCons LNSEATS PS_Adapt_Cons CV_winmargin (gov_party) 
Adj_AMCons 
 
1.000000 
 
0.168486 
 
0.601930 
 
0.294855 
 
LNSEATS 
 
0.168486 
 
1.000000 
 
0.168486 
 
0.054271 
 PS_Adapt_Cons 
 
0.601930 
 
0.288991 
 
1.000000 
 
0.230204 
 CV_winmargin 
(gov party) 
0.294855 0.054271 0.230204 1.000000 
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Table 1 
ARDL Models of Fiscal Stability: Canada 1870 - 2015  
(Newey West standard errors in brackets) 
 
Equation Type 
 
 
Dependent Variable 
(1) 
ARDL 
Equationt 
(2,1,1) 
LNGSIZE 
(2) 
LONG RUN 
 
 
LNGSIZE 
(3) 
SHORT RUN 
and ERROR 
CORRECTION 
D(LNGSIZE) 
(4) 
ARDL WITH 
COMPETITIONt 
(2,0,1,0,0,0) 
LNGSIZE 
(5) 
LONG RUN WITH 
COMPETITION 
 
LNGSIZE 
(6) 
SHORT RUN WITH 
COMPETITION 
VARIABLES 
D(LNGSIZE) 
LNGSIZE(-1) 
 
1.328*** 
(0.085)   
1.377*** 
(0.057) 
  
LNGSIZE(-2) 
 
-0.513*** 
(0.068)   
-0.665*** 
(0.078) 
  
LNGSIZE(-3) 
 
   0.193** (0.077) 
  
LNGSIZE(-4) 
 
   -0.084* (0.046) 
  
D(LNGSIZE(-1)) 
 
  0.513*** (0.050) 
  0.557*** 
(0.042) 
D(LNGSIZE(-2))      -0.108** (0.048) 
D(LNGSIZE(-3))      0.084* (0.044) 
LNTSIZEZ 
 
0.446** 
(0.203) 
1.00*** 
(0.060)  
0.158*** 
(0.044) 
0.919*** 
(0.090) 
 
LNTSIZE(-1) 
 
-0.261 
(0.182)   
   
D(LNTSIZE) 
 
  0.446*** (0.108) 
   
FCOST 
 
-0.006*** 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.005)  
-0.008** 
(0.001) 
-0.005 
(0.005) 
 
FCOST(-1) 
 
0.006*** 
(0.002)   
0.006*** 
(0.001) 
  
D(FCOST) 
 
  -0.006*** (0.001) 
  -0.008*** 
(0.001) 
LNSEATS 
 
   0.062* (0.033) 
0.360* 
(0.208) 
 
INTER_LNSEATS    -0.001 (0.001) 
-0.004 
(0.006) 
 
PS_ADAPT_CONS 
 
   -0.170** (0.072) 
-1.013** 
(0.410) 
 
WW1 
 
0.154*** 
(0.040)  
0.154*** 
(0.036) 
0.133*** 
(0.035) 
 -0.136*** 
(0.029) 
D1920 
 
-0.503*** 
(0.031)  
-0.503*** 
(0.076) 
-0.506*** 
(0.026) 
 -0.490*** 
(0.063) 
D1942 
 
0.431*** 
(0.044)  
-0.431*** 
(0.077) 
0.516*** 
(0.027) 
 0.482*** 
(0.062) 
D1946 -0.411*** (0.022)  
-0.411*** 
(0.075) 
-0.373*** 
(0.019) 
 -0.389*** 
(0.064) 
CONSTANT -0.017 (0.028 
-0.090 
(0.147)  
-0.114 
(0.150) 
-0.671 
(0.888) 
 
Error correction term   -0.185*** (0.031)   
-0.180*** 
(0.029) 
Bounds Test  
Critical upper bound 
 8.81*** 
I(1, 142) at 1% 
= 5.393 
 
5.04*** 
I(1,142) at 1% = 
4.59 
  
No. of Obs 142   142   
ARDL     AdjR2 0.984   0.989   
* (**)[***] significantly different from zero at 10% (5%) [1%]. Z insignificantly different from 1 at 1%; 
  t the recursive residuals pass the CUSUM and CUSUM of Squares tests at 5%.  
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Table 2 
ARDL Models of the Expenditure and Tax Size of Government:  
Canada 1870 - 2011  
(Newey West standard errors in brackets) 
 
Equation Type 
 
 
Dependent Variable 
(1) 
LONG RUN 
No PV’s 
 
LNGSIZE 
(2) 
SHORT 
RUN 
No PV’s 
D(LNGSIZE) 
(3) 
LONG RUN 
With PV’s 
 
LNGSIZE 
(4) 
SHORT 
RUNZ 
With PV’s 
D(LNGSIZE) 
(5) 
LONG RUN 
No PV’s 
 
LNTSIZE 
(6) 
SHORT RUN 
No PV’s 
 
D(LNTSIZE) 
(7) 
LONG RUN 
With PV’s 
 
LNTSIZE 
(8) 
SHORT 
RUNZ 
With PV’s 
D(LNTSIZE) 
D(LNGSIZE(-1)) 
  
0.393*** 
(0.050)  
0.360*** 
(0.047)   
  
D(LNTSIZE(-1)) 
      
0.386*** 
(0.062) 
 0.437*** 
(0.059) 
D(LNTSIZE(-2)) 
      
-0.328*** 
(0.063) 
 -0.290*** 
(0.058) 
LNAGRIC 
 
-0.061 
(0.242)  
-0.133 
(0.188)  
-0.022 
(0.137)  
-0.008 
(0.079) 
 
LNYOUNG 
 
1.829*** 
(0.340)  
1.789*** 
(0.334)  
1.700*** 
(0.366)  
1.541*** 
(0.189) 
 
LNOPEN 
 
0.088 
(0.374)  
0.062 
(0.271)  
0.367* 
(0.221)  
0.225* 
(0.125) 
 
LNIMRATIO 
 
-0.069 
(0.056)  
-0.092* 
(0.047)  
-0.149*** 
(0.043)  
-0.136*** 
(0.023) 
 
D(LNIMRATIO) 
  
-0.085*** 
(0.021)     
 0.011 
(0.010) 
D(LNIMRATI0(-1)) 
       
 -0.0005 
(0.010) 
D(LNIMRATIO(-2)) 
       
 0.034*** 
(0.009) 
LNRGDPPC 
 
0.816*** 
(0.293)  
0.692*** 
(0.241)  
0.733*** 
(0.170)  
0.806*** 
(0.117) 
 
D(LNRGDPPC) 
  
-0.708*** 
(0.144)  
-0.783*** 
(0.127)  
-0.332*** 
(0.073) 
 -0.310*** 
(0.064) 
D(LNRGDPPC(-1)) 
  
0.533*** 
(0.166)    
0.154* 
(0.078) 
 -0.059 
(0.082) 
D(LNRGDPPC(-2)) 
      
-0.280*** 
(0.076) 
 -0.297*** 
(0.080) 
LNSEATS 
   
0.820*** 
(0.264)    
0.538*** 
(0.142) 
 
INTER_LNSEATS 
   
-0.005 
(0.007)    
-0.001 
(0.003) 
 
D(INTER_LNSEATS) 
       
 -0.002** 
(0.001) 
D(INTER_LNSEATS(-1) 
       
 0.003*** 
(0.001) 
PS_ADAPT_Cons 
   
-1.006* 
(0.549)    
0.967*** 
(0.268) 
 
D(PS_ADAPT_Cons) 
       
  
Adj_AMCons_SD 
   
0.060 
(0.248)    
-0.524** 
(0.198) 
 
D1920 
  
-0.527*** 
(0.080)  
-0.597*** 
(0.074)   
  
D1930 
      
-0.136*** 
(0.042) 
 -0.130*** 
(0.034) 
WW2  0.225***  0.307***  0.226***  0.220*** 
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 (0.048) (0.041) (0.023) (0.020) 
D1942 
                    
0.426*** 
(0.0.086)  
0.437*** 
(0.082)   
  
D1944 
      
-0.178*** 
(0.047) 
 -0.189*** 
(0.040) 
D1974 
      
0.099*** 
(0.042) 
 0.137*** 
(0.035) 
CONSTANT  -2.045 (4.584) 
-12.70*** 
(3.11)  
-11.40*** 
(2.705)  
-13.34*** 
(1.57)) 
 
Error correction 
termz (1%CV= 4.79)  
-0.177*** 
(6.779)  
-0.242*** 
(11.42)  
-0.108*** 
(6.975) 
 -0.180*** 
(9.100) 
Bounds Test  
Critical upper bound 
7.372 
I(1,142) at 1% 
= 5.163 
 
10.96 
I(1,138)at 
1% = 3.68 
 
6.637 
I(1,143) at 
1%=4.587 
 
6.91 
I(1,136) at 
1%=3.68 
 
No. of Obs 
AdjR2 
142 
0.982  
136 
0.983  
143 
0.993  
136 
0.995 
 
* (**)[***] significantly different from zero at 10% (5%) [1%].  
Z Error correction term presents absolute value of t-statistic to allow easier comparison with critical 1% value 
 t the recursive residuals pass the CUSUM and CUSUM of Squares tests at 5%. 
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Table 3 
Federal Government Operating Deficits and Political Competition: 
Canada 1879 - 2015 
(Newey-West standard errors in brackets) 
                                   Dependent Variable 
(1) 
LNDEFICITt 
(2) 
LNDEFICITt 
 
LNDEFICIT(-1) 
 
1.393*** 
(0.080) 
1.352*** 
(0.075) 
LNDEFICIT(-2) 
 
-0.662*** 
(0.109) 
-0.645*** 
(0.109) 
LNDEFICIT(-3) 
 
0.142** 
(0.059) 
0.130** 
(0.059) 
GROWTH_RGDPPC 
 
-0.709*** 
(0.225) 
-0.712*** 
(0.219) 
GROWTH_RGDPPC(-1) 
 
0.303* 
(0.187) 
0.321** 
(0.155) 
LNSEATS 
 
 0.093** 
(0.041) 
D(INTER_LNSEATS) 
 
 -0.001 
(0.002)) 
PS_ADAPT_CONS 
 
 -0.272** 
(0.115) 
ADJ_AMCONS_SD 
 
 0.073 
(0.067) 
D1920 
                    
-0.608*** 
(0.028) 
-0.619*** 
(0.026) 
D1942 
                    
0.543*** 
(0.029) 
0.549*** 
(0.031) 
D1946 
 
-0.462*** 
(0.023) 
-0.410*** 
(0.022) 
CONSTANT 
 
0.001 
(0.009) 
-0.265 
(0.165) 
No. of Obs. 
AdjR2 
Wald[c(7)=c(8)=c(9)=c(10)=0] 
138 
0.897 
137 
0.905 
F(4,124) =3.2     
Prob = 0.015 
* (**)[***] significantly different from zero at 10% (5%) [1%]. Z insignificantly different from 1 at 1%; 
  t the recursive residuals pass the CUSUM and CUSUM of Squares tests at 5%. 
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